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Abstract
Since the explosion of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011,
public anxiety surrounding the radioactive contamination of food and the environment
has become widespread. This article examines how the price of vegetables in the Tokyo
Metropolitan Central Wholesale Market was impacted in the wake of the nuclear accident.
This study exploits the quasi-experimental condition generated by this accident to test the
market price change using monthly panel data on the price of six types of fresh vegetable
from each of the 47 prefectures in Japan. Our estimation results show that the price of
vegetables grown in Fukushima Prefecture was discounted by 10 - 38 % after the disaster
compared to the counter-factual estimates in the absence of a perceived radiation risk.
This eect has persisted even after radioactive detection tests showed negative results in
subsequent years. Consumer behavior of avoiding purchasing vegetables from Fukushima
and instead buying vegetables grown in other areas may explain the price gap.
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1 Introduction
The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, the tsunami that followed, and the
resulting accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant (NPP) caused devastating socioeconomic damage to Eastern Japan. Soon after the
nuclear power plant accident, public anxiety surrounding the radioactive contamination of
food and the environment became widespread.
In this article, the price of six types of fresh vegetables (asparagus, bean sprouts, broc-
coli, cucumbers, green beans and tomatoes) is used to examine how the actual pricing of
agricultural produce in the wholesale market in Tokyo, which is the largest consumption cen-
ter for agricultural produce from Eastern Japan, was impacted in the wake of the nuclear
accident. If urban consumers fear that food produced in or near Fukushima is more likely
to contain radioactive materials and thus to be more harmful to their health, they would
avoid purchasing those products and instead buy substitutes produced in areas distant from
Fukushima. Since 2000, Japanese agricultural regulations have mandated that agricultural
produce should be labeled with the site of origin and that this information should be made
available to consumers. We use this information to assess the market reaction to radiation
risk under the shock of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident.
In addition to the practical importance of assessing the impact of this nuclear disaster
(the largest in scale) on agricultural markets, the use of agricultural price data makes a
novel contribution to the hedonic environmental valuation literature by assessing urbanites'
perception of environmental risks. Unlike houses, vegetables are transported from the site of
origin and delivered to consumer locations. This mobility allows us to assess urban consumers'
risk perception (willingness to accept the risk) toward an environmental hazard originating at
a distant location. The large number of transactions in the urban consumption center and the
mobility allow their hedonic price functions to follow those of dierentiated products (Rosen
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1974, Epple 1984). In addition, the perishable nature of fresh vegetables allows our analysis
to focus on short-term risk perception, whereas house prices are subject to expectations in
response to future environmental changes (Kiel and McClain 1995; Gayer and Viscusi 2002;
Tajima 2003).
In this study, we analyze monthly panel data on the mean price (monthly average of
auction prices per kilogram) of six types of vegetables traded in the Tokyo Metropolitan
Central Wholesale Market from January 2006 to March 2015. Monthly price data are available
at the level of 47 Japanese prefectures, allowing us to estimate the marginal eect of the
perceived radiation risk on the market price before and after the nuclear accident, exploiting
the quasi-experimental condition generated by the nuclear accident. The estimation results
show that having been grown in Fukushima Prefecture emerges as a new factor that decreased
the value of vegetables traded in the Tokyo wholesale market by 10-38 percent. The proximity
of the neighboring prefectures and the Fukushima Daiichi NPP has a relatively small inuence
on the price of vegetables.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the hedonic studies of
environmental hazards and food safety. Section 3 provides the background for this disastrous
event. Section 4 presents our theoretical and econometric models and describes the data,
and Section 5 summarizes the empirical results. Section 6 concludes and provides policy
implications.
2 Literature
This study builds on the intersection of two distinct lines of research that use the hedonic pric-
ing method: (1) studies that examined the impact of proximity to environmentally hazardous
sites on local housing prices and (2) studies that measured the eects of health benets or
risks on the price of agricultural products. Recent studies that aimed to measure the impact
of the Fukushima nuclear accident are also reviewed with respect to these lines of research.
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Urban and environmental economists have long used the hedonic pricing method to esti-
mate the risk perception associated with environmental hazards. The majority of the litera-
ture uses local housing transaction data as well as repeated sales data to single out the eects
of risks originating from hazardous waste sites (Kohlhase 1991, Kiel 1995, Kiel and McClain
1995, Gayer and Viscusi 2002, Greenstone and Gallagher 2008). Naoi, Seko and Sumita
(2009) analyzed rents and owner-provided value for houses in a household panel survey to
show that risk perception toward earthquakes experienced upward revision after major earth-
quakes. Other studies analyzing the impact of spent nuclear waste used their transportation
route (rail track) and proximity to assess their impact on local housing prices (Gawande and
Jenkins-Smith 2001, Gawande et al. 2013). The basis for using house prices is that these are
xed in specic locations, as is the source of environmental hazards, and a clear relationship
can be established between them through their geographical proximity. These relationships
are represented in econometric models as a distance or a dummy variable to indicate the
likelihood of environmental risk in a particular area.
Recent studies have contributed to the above-mentioned literature by addressing the im-
pacts of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The immediate impacts of radioactive contamina-
tion on appraised land prices (Yamane, Ohgaki and Asano 2013) and market transaction land
prices (Kawaguchi and Yukutake 2014) were estimated using a hedonic pricing framework and
ndings demonstrate that the actual contamination level reduced the land price signicantly.
Researchers outside of Japan tested whether the Fukushima nuclear disaster increased the
risk perception of consumers toward nuclear power plants. Using a dierence-in-dierence
hedonic approach, Fink and Stratmann (2013) did not nd a revision (discount) of house
prices in areas located near nuclear power plants in the United States. In contrast, Boes,
Nuesch and Wuthrich (2014) nd a 2.3% discount in advertised apartment rents near nuclear
power plants in Switzerland after the Fukushima accident, and Zhu et al. (2014) nd a short-
term (one month after the Fukushima disaster) but signicant reduction in land transaction
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price within 40km from active nuclear plants in China.
Food and agricultural economists have applied the hedonic pricing method to estimate
the eects of various characteristics of vegetables, such as size, color, ripeness, and taste,
on their retail price (Huang and Lin 2007). This technique has also been used to estimate
the loss of value associated with potential health risks or the price premium associated with
avoided pesticide risks for organic foods (Estes and Smith 1996, Thompson and Kidwell 1998,
Maguire, Owens et al. 2004, Lin, Smith et al. 2008), the reduced price of genetically modied
organisms (Loureiro and Hine 2004), and the price reduction for milk produced from cloned
cows (Brooks and Lusk 2010). Asche and Guillen (2012) addressed the negative eects of
certain sites of origin on the market prices of frozen sh (Spanish hake) and attributed these to
general environmental concerns of consumers that could not be ascribed to a particular hazard
source. Most of this literature uses individual purchases at retail stores as the unit of analysis
based on eld surveys or the use of scanner data. These trade variables are complemented
by identiers of the purchaser's characteristics (typically age, gender, income, education and
household attributes, such as if they live with young children) to analyze the role of these
attributes in purchasing decisions. Our empirical method is based on the literature described
above. However, the use of monthly prefecture-level data on wholesale price and quantity
requires a unique approach, such as the use of a panel estimation model, to address the
aggregated nature of our data.
In the wake of the Fukushima accident, a signicant number of Japanese scholars addressed
the impacts of radioactive food risks or the public anxiety associated with these risks. Ujiie
(2013) analyzed consecutive questionnaire surveys that were conducted every four months
after the earthquake to estimate consumers' willingness to accept (WTA) or buy produce
(spinach and milk) from Fukushima and Ibaraki Prefectures1. He then estimated the contri-
bution of \health risk due to radioactive contamination" and the \origin of the food." The
1Ibaraki Prefecture is adjacent to Fukushima Prefecture to the south.
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results suggested that consumers' aversion to agricultural food due to fear of contamination
remained strong two years after the nuclear accident. The level of aversion was higher for
the respondents living in Western Japan (Osaka) compared with Eastern Japan (Tokyo). In
addition, Ujiie (2014) suggested that the demand for food produced in \distant" areas was
rising among major retailers.
Other researchers addressed these issues using stated-preference economic studies, such as
choice experiments (Kuriyama 2012), conjoint surveys, and other forms of consumer survey.
Most studies obtained consistent results that suggested prevalent lower willingness to pay for
fresh food produced in the disaster-aected areas in the wake of the nuclear disaster. Yoshino
(2013) examined actual market price data to estimate the losses due to price reduction after
the nuclear incident. He estimated the typical yearly price gaps in the years prior to the
nuclear accident and compared the result with the actual price dierence after the accident.
Although this approach is suitable for estimating the aggregate welfare loss, it does not allow
us to compare the change in consumer behavior before and after the crisis. Kikuchi (2013)
compares the price of vegetables produced in Fukushima Prefecture in the Tokyo Wholesale
Market to the average prices over four years prior to the nuclear accident. He nds that most
vegetables produced in Fukushima lost both their value and their share in the Tokyo market
after the nuclear accident, and this trend worsened in the second year compared to the rst.
3 Background
3.1 The Great East Japan Earthquake
On the afternoon of March 11, 2011, the largest-magnitude earthquake ever recorded in Japan
struck the eastern part of the country (known as the Tohoku area). Its eects were particularly
strong in the region adjacent to the Pacic Ocean. The epicenter of the earthquake was only
70 km away from Sendai city, the largest city in the Tohoku area (see Figure 1), and magnitude
of 9.0 meant it was the world's fth largest earthquake in the last 100 years.
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////////////// Insert Figure 1 around here ////////////////
It was not the earthquake itself but the resulting tsunami that caused the majority of
the damage. Although rescue teams were dispatched from 29 countries and international
organizations, the number of casualties totaled more than 15,000. The tsunami exacerbated
the damage by striking the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Losing electricity to
support all means of cooling, the nuclear reactors in the plant, none in operation but all
containing spent nuclear fuel, exploded (phreatic explosion), and a large amount of radioactive
material was released into the air.2 Figure 2 depicts the change in the aerial radiation dose in
four cities including Fukushima city, which is 65 km away from the nuclear plant, and farther
locations shown in Figure 1. A signicant increase of radiation dose occurred immediately
after the phreatic explosion but declined sharply within the next few days.3
////////////// Insert Figure 2 around here ////////////////
Because the wind direction was mainly to the South, Ibaraki Prefecture, which is adjacent
to the south of Fukushima, was exposed to a higher risk of radioactive material fall-out. The
dose level of Ibaraki Prefecture only recently returned to normal, whereas Tokyo returned its
normal level within several months. Hokkaido and most of Western Japan were not aected
in terms of their aerial radiation dose. Soon after the earthquake, it became common to see
information on aerial radiation doses at the prefectural level in the media on a daily basis.
Repeated exposure to this type of information might have created a new perception of risk
for Japanese consumers.
3.2 Food Safety Measures and Consumers' Risk Perception
To address public anxiety, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW)
adopted provisional regulations on the level of radioactive substances in foods on March 17,
2This incident was recorded as level 7 in the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) determined by IAEA.
It is the second level 7 event in history. The rst level 7 event was the Chernobyl disaster.
3The data for Fukushima in Figure 2 have many gaps due to the loss of electricity. After the emergency
electric supply was exhausted, the data record was no longer available.
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2011. These regulations designate the maximum permissible dose of radioactive substances
for each food category; the value for radioactive cesium in general food products was set
at 500 Becquerel/kg or less. A smaller dose of 100 Becquerel/kg was applied in a revised
regulation enacted in April 2012, approximately one year after the earthquake (Hosono et al.
2013).
To avoid distributing foods that were contaminated above the maximum permissible level
of radioactive cesium, local government authorities, producers, consumer organizations, and
retailers conducted intensive radiation inspections of foods produced in Eastern Japan. Foods
contaminated above the permissible level were banned from market distribution, and the
restriction was often extended to the community or prefectural level. The incidents of reported
high-level contamination in fresh vegetables were concentrated in the rst few weeks after
the accident and from certain prefectures in and near Fukushima. On March 21, 2011,
the Japanese government restricted distribution of spinach produced in Fukushima, Tochigi,
Ibaraki, and Gunma Prefectures and two days later the restriction was extended to other
leafy vegetables and ower-head brassicas (e.g., broccoli and cauliowers) from Fukushima
and two cities in Chiba Prefecture.4
Table 1 summarizes the results of the food tests. Regardless of the upward revision of the
maximum permissible dose in April 2012, the percentage of positive results was the highest
in the rst year (April 2011 to March 2012). In more than 99.9% of all foods tested in recent
years, any remaining radioactive cesium has been below the detectable level.
////////////// Insert Table 1 around here ////////////////
As dened by the regulation and active radioactive detector testing, the food products
distributed in the market are considered safe. However, after more than three years since the
4The entire list of distribution restrictions since the 2011 disaster for each prefecture is avail-
able from Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare in English and is updated on a regular basis.
See http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/2011eq/dl/food instruction August25 2015.pdf (Accessed
on September 8, 2015)
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nuclear accident, a number of reports suggest that the market demand for foods produced in
or near Fukushima continues to be reduced due to fear of food contamination. A consumer
monitor survey by the Japanese Food Safety Commission (2013) found that as of August
2013, more than half of their 353 monitors remained worried about food contaminated with
radioactive materials; 29.5 percent were \very worried" (the highest choice in the 5-point
Likert scale), and 38.0 percent were \worried" (second highest). Among those who reported
to be \very worried," 37.5 percent responded to another question that they were \avoiding
eating/purchasing food that is suspected to be contaminated even though it is below the
permissible level." In response to such consumer reactions, in April 2013, a national television
news program reported that food distributers assume that end-users avoid food products from
Fukushima Prefecture; they cited experts stating that the initial disorder in releasing food
safety information and the revision of the regulations discouraged consumers from trusting
authorities, such as the Japanese government and the scientic community (Japan Broadcast
Company, 2013).
The disparity between the safety standard imposed by the government and consumers'
perception may be explained by the dierence in the foundation of the risk perception. The
national safety standard is designated based on clinically and/or experimentally proven health
risks. In this case, the threshold exposure level is 50 m Sievert/year, which is considered to
be associated with the development of thyroid cancer (Michino 2012).
For general consumers, the risk is less clear. They may form risk perceptions based on
their exposure to general information on radiation risks (e.g., former detector test results,
aerial radiation doses), and the media may even be biased toward fear. Consumers also
fear latent risks that are currently unknown. A good example of a latent risk of exposure to
radioactive fallout can be drawn from a study on the subclinical legacy of Chernobyl (Almond
et al. 2009). The authors compared the academic performance of Swedish students who were
exposed to the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accidents in utero to those in adjacent
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cohorts or those from areas that had less fallout exposure. Prenatal exposure to relatively
high (but clinically considered harmless) radioactive doses led to lower test scores and lower
rates of qualifying for high school education.
3.3 Labeling Mandate for the Site of Origin of Agricultural Produce
In response to the new risk of food contamination with radioactive substances, Japanese
consumers have developed a habit of checking the site of origin when they buy agricultural
produce (Food Safety Commission 2013). Labeling the site of origin for agricultural products
{ at the prefecture level if it is domestically produced and at the national level if imported
{ was mandated in 2000 in the Japanese Agricultural Standards (JAS), which are specied
under the Law Concerning Standardization and Proper Quality Labeling of Agricultural and
Forestry Products (Law No.175 in 1950). The site-origin labeling mandate was initially
intended to give consumers references to pesticide standards, which vary among countries
and regions, as well as to respond to \buy local" movements.5
4 The Model
4.1 Theoretical Framework
To establish the market condition to which each consumer is subjected, we should consider
that the real risk is unknown to a purchaser for the following two reasons. First, the purchaser
is not able to denitively know whether the particular product (i.e., the bag of cucumbers
in front of him/her) is contaminated with radioactive substances because the radioactive
detector test is conducted on a sampling basis. Second, although the government informs
consumers of the maximum permissible dose of radioactive substances, consumers do not
know exactly which level of intake would harm their health, how, and to what degree. In
5Should a retailer intentionally label some agricultural produce with a dierent site of origin (to sell it),
the retailer would be charged with a violation of the JAS law and Unfair Competition Prevention Act (Act
No. 47 of May 19, 1993). There are penalties for these violations, but it is rather dicult to monitor and
enforce these rulings. In fact, most charges arise from reporting by employees (whistleblowers). Thus, we do
not discuss this issue further and simply assume that the site of origin is properly labeled in the following
analysis.
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short, consumers face market decisions with highly limited information; at a retail store,
the information available to the shopper is typically price, appearance (through which the
shopper assesses the quantity and quality of the produce), and the growing site (labeled at
the prefectural level).
Let us assume that the market price of a type of vegetable i produced in prefecture s at
time t is determined as
pist = f(rist; Xist); (1)
where ristis the perceived risk of intake of radioactive substances embodied in vegetable i
produced in s at time t, and Xist is the vector of factors that may aect the market price of
the vegetable other than the perceived risk of a radioactive substance.
The price gradient with respect to the perceived risk of a radioactive substance is the
parameter of focus in this study. Similar to pesticide risk, perceived radiation risk is expected
to discourage consumers from buying aected produce. This consumer response toward food




Before the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011, the risks associated with radioactive
substances were not widely perceived in the domestic food market in Japan. In the wake of
the accident, they were suddenly perceived as an immediate risk and were associated with
the Fukushima Nuclear Plant location. Consumers responded to the risk by avoiding foods
produced in and/or near Fukushima.
4.2 Empirical Framework
The notable issue is how to analyze the eect of the perceived radiation risk due to the
accident at Fukushima Nuclear Plant on the price of vegetables. Given the lack of data on
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the levels of radioactive contaminants in each vegetable in the wholesale market, we use two
treatment variables discussed in detail in the Data section to denote the perceived risk, which
appears as r in (1) and (2).
Using monthly-panel market price data for each type of vegetable i grown in prefecture
s at time t (year-month), we use the following regression model to identify the impacts of
perceived radiation risk on vegetable prices in each scal year after the Fukushima disaster.
log(pist) = i +Xsti +
2014X
j=2011
ijTsDj + is + it + ist; (3)
where pist denotes the monthly average of the market trade price in Japanese yen per kilogram,
and Xst denotes the vector of factors that may aect the market price of vegetable i produced
in s at t other than the perceived risk of a radioactive substance. Ts denotes a treatment
variable that proxies the perceived radiation risk. Dj is a dummy variable that equals 1 when
the month falls between April of year j and March of year (j + 1), where j corresponds to
periods that follow the disaster: 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. This variable is a year-dummy
that considers both the timing in relation to the occurrence of the nuclear accident shown
in (2) and Japanese scal years that begin in April. is and it are xed-eect coecients
estimated on dummy variables that denote each of 47 prefectures and 111 year-month periods.
ist is the residual. We take the log of prices to address the nonlinear relationship between
the price and the treatment.
The inclusion of prefectural xed eects allows us to assume that some geographical
characteristics (such as transport cost to Tokyo) did not change over time. To control for
exogenous market conditions that might aect the overall market price level, we also include
xed eects for each period t (year-month).
By estimating a panel OLS regression with this specication under the conditional inde-
pendence assumption, one could interpret the value of ij as the price dierential with respect
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to the perceived risk, because from (3) we can derive
@E[log(pist)jj = 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014]
@Ts
= ij : (4)
Although one could estimate the coecients on the interacted terms for each period
t, the merit of the current form is its simplicity and more stable estimation; an intuitive
interpretation of ij would be an \annual mean of price discount" in the presence of perceived
radiation risk. The expected sign of the coecients is
ij < 0jj=2011;2012;2013;2014 (5)
This form of regression also allows us to include placebo tests by estimating the follow-
ing regression and seeing if ij estimated for the years before the nuclear accident are not
statistically dierent from zero.






ijTsDj + is + it + ist; (6)
Because information on individual purchases and purchasers is not available in our monthly
wholesale market data, our empirical strategy aims to capture a general trend across dierent
purchasers.6
4.3 Data
Our empirical analyses focus on fresh vegetables sold in the Tokyo Metropolitan Central
Wholesale Market.7 Fresh vegetables are perishable and thus shipped and sold in a few days
6Our price variable is the monthly average of the auction prices determined by wholesalers and buyers
(middle wholesalers and/or distributers) from the wholesale market. We assume that the buyers' bid price is
based on their short-term expectations of their retail sales.
7Since the \Central Wholesale Market Law" was enacted in March 1923, each prefecture has established
publicly owned wholesale markets at which fresh foods are collected and distributed, prices are set through fair
auctions between sellers and buyers, transaction accounts are settled, and information is provided on market
trades. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government established 11 Central Wholesale Markets in various locations
within its boundary to ensure fresh food for consumers (the population exceeds 13 million people); this is the
largest among all Japanese prefectures. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government administers the construction
of markets, maintains and manages the facilities, provides directions and supervises the handling of produce
according to the Wholesale Market Law and Ordinances. Nine markets trade vegetables, and the data we use
were the total values obtained from these nine markets (http://www.shijou.metro.tokyo.jp/english/).
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after being harvested,8 allowing us to focus on the market's short-term risk perception. In
addition, domestic produce still accounts for a major part of Japanese vegetable consump-
tion (76% self-suciency ratio, based on calories), although the country is known for a small
self-suciency ratio of only 39%9 for all foodstus (17% for meat and 37% for fruits, respec-
tively).10
The Tokyo Metropolitan Central Wholesale Market is the largest wholesale market in
Japan. According to the Production Agriculture Income Statistics from MAFF, the total
revenue in all wholesale markets together in Japan is 2.2 trillion JPY in 2010 and that of the
Tokyo wholesale market is about 432.8 billion JPY (19.1%). Although it is not adjacent to
Tokyo, vegetables from Fukushima at the Tokyo wholesale market had a certain amount of
presence before the earthquake. It was ranked 10th in terms of market share (2.6% in 2010).
The data used for our empirical analysis were obtained from the Market Trade Information
Website of the Tokyo Wholesale Market.11 This dataset contains variables on price (monthly
mean for each site-of-origin prefecture in JPY) and quantity (monthly total in kilograms for
each prefecture) during the period from January 2006 to March 2015. Our dependent variable
is the price (monthly average in JPY/kg), and for estimation, we take the natural logarithm
of the value.
For the following analyses, we choose six vegetables for which a signicant share at the
Tokyo Wholesale Market was grown in Fukushima (over 5%) before the earthquake (ve-
year average of the 2006-2010 period): asparagus (17%); bean sprouts (61%); broccoli (5%);
cucumbers (14%); green beans (27%); and tomatoes (6%).
Ideally, we should have the level of radioactive contamination in each prefecture at each
8Among storable agricultural produce or produce that takes a longer time to grow (i.e., rice, wheat, tea,
dried mushrooms), the actual growing period may vary among items sold at the market at the same time.
9This number is based on calories. See the website of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery
(MAFF) for more details (http://www.maff.go.jp/j/zyukyu/zikyu ritu/pdf/26ritu.pdf).
10According to MAFF, seafood has relatively high self-suciency ratio (67%). However, it is dicult to
discern where the seafood comes from in that the origin is determined by the seaport at which the seafood is
landed (and not where it is caught), we exclude them from our analysis.
11http://www.shijou-tokei.metro.tokyo.jp/index.html
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time, but as we described in the introduction, it is hard to obtain a single variable for each
prefecture that represents the level of contamination. To capture the possible risk of the
radioactive contamination of vegetables in each prefecture, we apply two treatment indices:
The rst is a Fukushima dummy variable that takes 1 for Fukushima Prefecture and 0 for
the other 46 prefectures. The second is a continuous variable that denotes the proximity of
the production site of each vegetable to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. This reects that the
risk of radioactive material is perceived to be larger when the production site is closer to the







where the distance from each prefecture's capital city to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP is
measured in kilometers.
The data for the monthly average price of vegetables are aggregated at the prefecture
level, and there are no data that can be used to capture the average quality of vegetables in
each prefecture. Instead, we use average temperature in degrees Celsius and its squared term
as the proxy variables for the quality of each vegetable. The quality of vegetables will increase
at the appropriate temperature, and extremely high or low temperatures will adversely aect
it. In addition, the set of prefectural dummy and year-month dummy variables are also used
as explanatory variables.
////////////// Insert Table 2 around here ////////////////
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. The 9 years and three months (111 months) of
data for the 47 prefectures should yield 5,217 observations for each type of vegetable. However,
because the number of prefectures that send certain vegetables to the Tokyo wholesale market




Table 3 shows the regression results for six vegetables in the form of (6), using the Fukushima
dummy as the treatment variable. For all ve types of vegetable except for tomatoes, the
coecients for the interaction of the \years after the nuclear accident" and \Fukushima",
namely ij , are negative and statistically signicant at a 99.9% signicance level. In con-
trast, ij , the interactions between \years before the accident" and \Fukushima", are mostly
statistically insignicant or positive, except for asparagus in 2010 and tomatoes in 2009.
////////////// Insert Table 3 around here ////////////////
The coecients and their standard errors are plotted in Figure 3 for each vegetable to
see their change over time. The lines above and below the dots show the 95% condence
interval. In scal years 2009 and 2010, the coecients rarely deviate from zero with statistical
signicance, while in 2011, all ve vegetables except for tomatoes take values smaller than
zero with a 95% signicance level. This trend persisted for following three years.
////////////// Insert Figure 3 around here ////////////////
With the semi-log functional form, we can interpret the value of  as the \percentage
change in the price of a vegetable in the presence of perceived risk (in this case, if it is
produced in Fukushima) compared to the counterfactual case in the absence of risk during
the same period." Thus, in the 2011 scal year, the price change rate of asparagus from
Fukushima was -18% (=exp[ 0:196] 1). The same interpretations give the price change due
to the risk for bean sprouts to be -38%(= exp[ 0:48]  1); broccoli -25%(= exp[ 0:29]  1);
cucumbers -12%(= exp[ 0:13]  1); and green beans -10%(= exp[ 0:10]  1).
Another important nding is that the impacts on the price of these ve vegetables re-
mained signicant in the three years that followed. The coecients on the interaction terms
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remained negative and signicant until 2014. For cucumbers and green beans, the magnitude
of the coecient became larger in scal year 2012 compared to 2011.
Bean sprouts are notable for the large magnitude of their price discount as well as the
standard errors. In contrast to other vegetables that are grown outside or in greenhouses with
natural daylight, bean sprouts are not supposed to be exposed to sunlight (similar to alfalfa
sprouts) and are grown inside, thus their production is not conditioned by weather or season.
This irrelevance to weather also explains easier inter-regional substitution, which might have
led to the decreased demand for the Fukushima-grown bean sprouts, resulting in the sharp
drop in price after the disaster.
With tomatoes, we observe a positive price change of 19% (= exp[0:176] 1). The change
is likely to be attributed to the market shortage of tomatoes in periods that followed the
earthquake; because prefectures in Northeastern Japan supplies the large share in the Tokyo
market during the summer season, but the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster reduced
the quantity supplied from these prefectures, and the increased supply from other regions
could not fully meet market demand.12
////////////// Insert Table 4 around here ////////////////
Table 4 contains the estimation results using Proximity as a continuous treatment vari-
able. In this estimation, the coecients of the Treatment-Year interaction terms can be
interpreted as the price elasticity with respect to proximity (inverse of distance) between the
growing site and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. For years after the nuclear disaster, the
coecients of the interaction terms for bean sprouts, broccoli, and green beans are mostly
negative, but those with statistical signicance at a 95% condence level were limited to bean
sprouts in FY2013 and broccoli in FY2011 and 2012. A coecient of -0.416 for bean sprouts
12Kikuchi (2013) shows that the average price of all domestic tomatoes in August 2011 was 28.2% higher
than the four-year average price in the same month in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. For the same period,
tomatoes produced in Fukushima experienced a 15.0% price increase.
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in FY2013 means that the price elasticity with respect to the distance to the Fukushima
Daiichi NPP is 0.42; when the distance increases by 1%, the price increases by 0.42%.
Our estimates above enable us to conclude that there is legitimate evidence of a price
decline for Fukushima grown vegetables due to the nuclear disaster. There are several reasons
why the market discriminates against the vegetables produced in Fukushima Prefecture. First,
consumers developed new shopping behaviors to check the origin of agricultural produce in
the wake of the nuclear accident and did not revise these behaviors afterwards. Whereas
cesium detection cases were widely reported and left consumers with strong anxiety shortly
after the disaster, current test results suggesting that this produce is safe rarely make news
headlines. As a result, only consumers who are eager to collect information on radiation risks
are informed with updated safety information, while other consumers are making decisions
based on outdated risk perceptions.
The estimation results show that the proximity of the production area and the Fukushima
Daiichi NPP has a relatively small inuence on the price of vegetables. As noted in Section 3,
the major portion of radioactive material fell in Fukushima and in other prefectures located
to the south of Fukushima prefecture. Thus the level of radioactive contamination is not
simply proportional to the distance from the NPP, and this may be one reason for the weak
relation between proximity to the NPP and the price of vegetables.
6 Conclusion
For all of the vegetables we examined, the eects of the nuclear accident on the price of
agricultural products grown in Fukushima Prefecture except for tomatoes were large and
statistically signicant, and these eects persisted for at least four years after the accident.
This result is striking given that cesium contamination was rarely detected and was never
above the maximum permissible level after the second year. Our estimation results also show
that the impacts of the proximity of Fukushima's neighboring prefectures and the Fukushima
18
Daiichi NPP are much smaller both in magnitude and statistical signicance.
To address issues associated with the lowered market price, food safety information must
be communicated to the consumer with a strong emphasis on revising their risk perception.
As noted in the overview of this article, some consumers still tend to avoid purchasing food
from Fukushima regardless of its contamination level. Removing the source of their anxiety
through appropriate risk communication measures is critical to fresh foods from Fukushima
Prefecture regaining their market competitiveness in major consumption areas.
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Figure 2: Change in Air Radiation Doses in Four Prefectures







































































































Figure 3: Changes in Estimated Coecients (FY2009-FY2014)
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B Tables
Table 1: Transition in Cesium Test Results
Number of Food Number of Tests in Rate of Tests
CesiumTests which the Dose Exceeded Dose over
Conducted the Safety Standard Safety Standard
APR2011-MAR2012 137,037 1,204 0.879%
APR2012-MAR2013 278,275 2,372 0.852%
APR2013-MAR2014 333,969 1,017 0.305%
Source: Ujiie (2014), based on the Ministry of Health and Welfare's publication
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Asparagus Bean sprouts Broccoli
Price 1197.07 467.76 180.43 209.40 376.12 465.55
Average temperature 15.34 8.64 14.53 8.32 13.48 7.33
Distance to Fukushima NPP 483.59 380.80 242.11 137.02 480.57 338.97
Fukushima dummy 0.05 0.21 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.19
No. of Obs. 2,094 1,270 2,411
Cucumbers Green Beans Tomatoes
Price 338.84 147.39 814.56 88.10 506.11 285.68
Average temperature 15.77 7.96 17.19 7.42 15.30 8.16
Distance to Fukushima NPP 510.08 403.60 558.97 468.02 532.31 371.58
Fukushima dummy 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17
No. of Obs. 2,863 2,120 3,716
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Table 3: Estimation Results (Treatment Variable: Fukushima as Binary)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asparagus Bean sprouts Broccoli Cucumbers Green beans Tomatoes
Average Temperature -0.013 -0.001 -0.019 -0.021 0.038 -0.030
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.015)
Average Temperature -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(squared) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Fukushima*FY09 0.069 0.078 0.042 0.041 0.006 -0.074
(0.030) (0.083) (0.044) (0.021) (0.036) (0.027)
Fukushima*FY10 -0.049 -0.119 0.155 -0.016 0.012 0.079
(0.022) (0.137) (0.038) (0.026) (0.044) (0.029)
Fukushima*FY11 -0.196 -0.480 -0.290 -0.132 -0.104 0.176
(0.041) (0.158) (0.031) (0.033) (0.028) (0.038)
Fukushima*FY12 -0.210 -0.464 -0.255 -0.173 -0.216 0.077
(0.032) (0.167) (0.042) (0.029) (0.034) (0.040)
Fukushima*FY13 -0.096 -0.507 -0.147 -0.112 -0.297 0.019
(0.029) (0.107) (0.032) (0.034) (0.039) (0.042)
Fukushima*FY14 -0.118 -0.487 -0.305 -0.162 -0.263 0.047
(0.034) (0.127) (0.040) (0.024) (0.034) (0.044)
Constant 7.322 4.755 6.191 6.261 6.673 6.050
(0.119) (0.076) (0.117) (0.105) (0.158) (0.067)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2094 1270 2411 2863 2120 3716
adj. R2 0.384 0.087 0.270 0.425 0.283 0.264
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 4: Estimation Results (Treatment Variable: Proximity is Continuous)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asparagus Bean sprouts Broccoli Cucumbers Green beans Tomatoes
Average Temperature -0.015 -0.001 -0.019 -0.021 0.038 -0.032
(0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.015)
Average Temperature -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000
(squared) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Proximity*FY09 0.007 -0.050 -0.032 -0.005 -0.034 0.011
(0.024) (0.109) (0.039) (0.022) (0.030) (0.028)
Proximity*FY10 -0.013 -0.357 -0.021 0.023 0.071 0.047
(0.025) (0.264) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) (0.026)
Proximity*FY11 0.065 -0.453 -0.091 -0.017 0.000 0.043
(0.048) (0.267) (0.037) (0.054) (0.025) (0.034)
Proximity*FY12 0.044 -0.454 -0.092 -0.030 0.002 0.015
(0.043) (0.296) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.032)
Proximity*FY13 0.048 -0.416 -0.019 0.011 0.019 0.058
(0.034) (0.132) (0.032) (0.039) (0.048) (0.038)
Proximity*FY14 0.061 -0.193 -0.052 -0.009 0.011 0.030
(0.041) (0.142) (0.034) (0.027) (0.041) (0.039)
Constant 7.341 4.744 6.195 6.263 6.678 6.056
(0.121) (0.076) (0.116) (0.105) (0.157) (0.067)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2094 1270 2411 2863 2120 3716
adj. R2 0.386 0.121 0.269 0.425 0.283 0.265
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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